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Abstract. Android apps are made of components which can leak infor-
mation between one another using the ICC mechanism. With the growing
momentum of Android, a number of research contributions have led to
tools for the intra-app analysis of Android apps. Unfortunately, these
state-of-the-art approaches, and the associated tools, have long left out
the security flaws that arise across the boundaries of single apps, in
the interaction between several apps. In this paper, we present a tool
called ApkCombiner which aims at reducing an inter-app communica-
tion problem to an intra-app inter-component communication problem.
In practice, ApkCombiner combines different apps into a single apk on
which existing tools can indirectly perform inter-app analysis. We have
evaluated ApkCombiner on a dataset of 3,000 real-world Android apps,
to demonstrate its capability to support static context-aware inter-app
analysis scenarios.
1 Introduction
Everyday, millions of users exploit their handheld devices, such as smartphones,
for online shopping, social networking, banking, email, etc. At the Google I/O
2014, it was revealed that there are now more than 1 billion active Android
users and over 50 billion app downloads so far. Thus, mobile applications are
increasingly playing an essential role in our daily life, making the safety guards in
mobile operating systems an important concern for researchers and practitioners.
Because the Android OS accounts for more than 80% of the global smartphone
shipments, it has become a primary target of hackers who are now developing
malicious apps at an industrial scale [1]. Kaspersky has even reported in a recent
security bulletin that, now, 98% of mobile malware found target the Android
platform.
An Android app is a combination of components that use a special interac-
tion mechanism to perform Inter-Component Communication (ICC). This light
communication model has been exploited by developers to design rich appli-
cation scenarios by reusing existing functionality. Unfortunately, because many
Android developers have limited expertise in security, the ICC mechanism has
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brought a number of vulnerabilities [4,18]. Examples of known ICC vulnerabili-
ties 3 include the Activity Hijacking vulnerability (where a malicious Activity is
launched in place of the intended Activity) and the Intent spoofing vulnerability
(where a malicious app sends Intents to an exported component which originally
does not expect Intents from that app). In previous work [17], we have shown
that Android components can exploit such ICC vulnerabilities to leak private
data. More recent works have further demonstrated that Android apps exhibit
various privacy leaks that are built around the ICC mechanism [13,16,20].
The privacy leaks in Android are further exacerbated by the fact that several
applications can interact and “collaborate” to leak data using the inter-app
communication (IAC) mechanism. IAC and ICC are similar in Android, and
thus present the same vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art analysis
tools are focused on ICC by analyzing a single app at a time. Consequently,
inter-app privacy leaks cannot be identified and managed by existing tools and
approaches from the literature.
In this paper we propose to empower existing static analysis tools for Android
to work beyond the boundaries of a single app, so as to highlight security flaws
in the interactions between two or more apps. To that end we have designed
and developed a tool called ApkCombiner which takes as input several apps
that may cohabit in the same device, and yields a single app package (i.e.,
apk) combining the different components from the different apps. The resulting
package is ensured to be ready for analysis by existing tools. Thus, since the IAC
mechanism is the same as the ICC mechanism, by combining apps, ApkCombiner
reduces an IAC problem to an ICC problem, allowing existing tools to indirectly
perform inter-app analysis without any modification.
During the combination of multiple Android apps, some classes may conflict
with one another. In this paper, we take into account two types of conflict:
1) the conflicted classes are exactly same (same name and same content), we
solve this type of conflicts by simply dropping the duplicated classes and 2) the
conflicted classes are different (same name but different content), we solve this
type of conflicts by first renaming the conflicted classes, and then ensuring that
all dependencies and calls related to those classes are respected throughout the
app code.
The contribution of this paper are as follows:
– We discuss the need for tools to support inter-app analysis, and present a
non-intrusive approach that can be leveraged by existing tools which are
focused on intra-app analysis.
– We provide a prototype implementation of ApkCombiner4, using an effective
algorithm to solve different conflicts which may arise during the combination
of multiple Android apps into one.
– We propose an evaluation of ApkCombiner on both a motivating example
and on a dataset of real-world Android apps. The experimental results show
3 Refer to Section 2.1 for the concept of component, Activity and Intent in Android.
4 We make available our full implementation, along with the experimental results at:
https://github.com/lilicoding/ApkCombiner
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that state-of-the-art intra-app analyzers can efficiently leverage our approach
to indirectly perform inter-app analyses.
2 Background and Motivation
In this section we first briefly introduce different concepts that are specific to
Android (cf. Section 2.1). Then, we motivate our work by highlighting the limita-
tions of state-of-the-art static analysis approaches targeting the Android system
(cf. Section 2.2). Finally, we discuss in Section 2.3 an IAC vulnerability through
a running example.
2.1 Android IAC Overview
In Android, the inter-component communication (ICC) mechanism allows two
components to exchange data and invoke each other. The Android inter-app
communication (IAC) mechanism works in the same way and exploits the ICC
mechanism to make components from different apps interact. An ICC is typically
triggered by one of several specific Android methods which are related to the
different components in presence (i.e., either an Activity, Service, Content
Provider, Broadcast Receiver). Those methods5 take as parameter a special
kind of object, called Intent, which specifies the target component(s), either
explicitly, by setting the name of the target component’s class, or implicitly, by
setting the action to perform, the category and the input data. Obviously, since
it is hard for developers to predict which other apps will be available at the same
time, IAC invocations are almost always performed through implicit Intents. In
order to receive implicit Intents, target components in separate apps need to
declare their capabilities, through an Intent Filter, in the app manifest file so
that the Android system may match them when requested by a given app.
2.2 Static Analysis for Android Apps
Static program analysis has been widely used to address security issues, e.g.,
related to data integrity and confidentiality of information flow [7], as well as
for anomaly detection [11,19]. More recently, static analysis techniques have also
been applied for dissecting Android applications [9,12,14]. However, we note that
current approaches still present a number of limitations when they are targeted
to code from the Android system.
In the most common case, a static analysis of Android is reduced to an
intra-app analysis, where the bytecode of an app is extracted, and parsed to
produce a control-flow graph (CFG) to further perform specific analysis. For
example, FlowDroid [2], a recent state-of-the-art Android analysis approach,
builds CFG for static taint analysis. When the analysis must take into account
the interaction between two or more apps, it is refered to as an inter-app analysis
and may operate in three different ways as illustrated in Fig. 1.
5 Except Content Provider related methods.
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Fig. 1: Different approaches for Enabling Inter-App analysis of Android apps.
At a high livel, there are two options for enabling inter-app analysis: (1)
perform intra-app analysis of each app independently from the others and rely
on these analysis results to infer inter-app analysis output; or (2) combine the
apps first before performing the analysis.
In scenario (B1), the results of the intra-app analyses (i.e., flows f1 and f2)
are combined to yield a potential flow between the apps. However, because the
combination is performed after the analysis, no context data (e.g., variable values
such as data handled by the Intents) is available, and thus the scenario requires
to approximate the flows between the apps (e.g., here line (1)). This scenario
may thus lead to a significant number of false positives.
Scenario (B2) is an improved version of (B1) where it is no longer the results
that are combined but the CFGs instead. This scenario thus supports a context-
aware inter-app analysis by operating on a combined CFG and on a data depen-
dence graph (DDG) between the apps. Nevertheless, such an approach cannot
be generalized to any instances of CFG. In practice for example, the workload
for combining CFGs generated by Soot [15] can not even be applied in the case
of CFGs generated by Wala6. Thus, specific development effort must be put into
each and every static intra-app analyzer to support inter-app analysis.
Scenario (C) considers the caveats of all previous approaches by further im-
proving scenario (B2) to yield a general approach for enabling context-aware
inter-app analysis of Android apps. Thus, instead of combining separate CFGs
from different apps as in scenario (B2), the approach would consist in combining
the complete apps at the bytecode level. The generated single app package is thus
immediately ready for analysis with static intra-app analysis tools. The analysis
results will then contain information that could only be obtained through inter-
app analysis. This paper presents the design and implementation of a tool for
6 http://wala.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php
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supporting such an approach where no modification of current state-of-the-art
tools will be required to perform inter-app analyses.
Table 1 summarizes the fact that most state-of-the-art static analysis ap-
proaches for Android only deal with intra-app analysis. DidFail [13], the only
approach that considers inter-app analysis, falls under scenario (B1) described
above. Yet, as reminded by the classification in Table 2, this scenario leads to a
context-unaware analysis, and thus to many false positives in the results.
Table 1: State-of-the-art approaches
Intra-App(Inter-Comp) Inter-App
IccTA [16] DidFail [13]
AmanDroid [20]
ScanDroid [10]
SEFA [21]
CoChecker [5]
Table 2: Classification of scenarios for static
inter-app analysis approaches. (B1), (B2)
and (C) refer to the scenarios illustrated in
Fig. 1.
Non-General General
Context-Unaware (B1)
Context-Aware (B2) (C)
2.3 A Running Example
Fig. 2 presents a running example that shows an IAC vulnerability. The ex-
ample is extracted from a test case of DroidBench7 refered among its list as
InterAppCommunication sendBroadcast1. The example consists of two Android
applications, refered to as sendBroadcast1 source and sendBroadcast1 sink.
11: class InFlowActivity extends Activity 
12: {
13: protected void onCreate(Bundle b) {
14: Intent i = getIntent();
15:  String imei = i.getStringExtra("DroidBench");
16:  Log.i("DroidBench", imei);
17: }}
1: class OutFlowActivity extends Activity{
2: protected void onCreate(Bundle b) {
3: //tm = default TelephonyManager; 
4: String imei = tm.getDeviceId();
5: Intent i = new Intent();
6: i.setAction("lu.uni.serval.iac_sendbroadcast1.ACTION");
7: i.putExtra("DroidBench", imei);
8: sendBroadcast(i); }}
21: <activity android:label="@string/app_name" android:name="lu.uni.serval.iac_sendbroadcast1_sink.InFlowReceiver">
22:  <intent-filter>
23:   <action android:name="lu.uni.serval.iac_sendbroadcast1.ACTION" />
24:   <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
25:  </intent-filter>
26: </activity>
App1: sendbroadcast1_source App2: sendbroadcast1_sink
App2: AndroidManifest
Fig. 2: A running example that shows an inter-app vulnerability.
App sendBroadcast1 source contains a simple Activity component, named
OutFlowActivity, which first obtains the device ID (line 4) and then stores
it into an Intent (line 7) which is then forwarded to other components (poten-
tially in other applications since the Intent is implicit (line 6)). App sendBroad-
cast1 sink contains a component called InFlowActivity, which first extracts
data from the received Intent and then logs it into disk.
7 DroidBench is a set of hand-crafted Android apps used as a ground truth dataset
to evaluate how well static and dynamic security tools find data leaks. https://
github.com/secure-software-engineering/DroidBench
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In this example, we consider device ID, which is protected by a permission
check of the Android system, to be sensitive data. We also consider the log()
method to be dangerous behavior since it writes data into disk, therefore leaving
it accessible to any applications, including anyone which does not have permis-
sion to access the device ID through the Android OS. Thanks to the declarations
in the Manifest file in the package of sendBroadcast1 sink, OutFlowActivity
is able to communicate with InFlowActivity using the sendBroadcast() ICC
method. Thus, through the interaction between these two apps, a sensitive data
can be leaked.
Unfortunately, the current state-of-the-art static analysis tools, including
FlowDroid and IccTA, cannot tackle the kind of IAC problem described above.
Since these tools have already proven to be efficient in statically identifying bugs
and leaks across components inside a single app, we aim at enabling them to
do the same across applications. We further put a constrain on remaining non
intrusive, i.e., to avoid applying any modification on them, so as to avoid intro-
ducing limitations or new bugs in these tools. We thus propose ApkCombiner,
which, by combining multiple apps into one, reduces the IAC problem to an ICC
problem that state-of-the-art tools can solve in an intra-app analysis.
3 ApkCombiner
We now discuss the design and implementation of ApkCombiner. First we present
an overview of the approach in Section 3.1 before providing details on how we
address the case of conflicting code, typically same-name classes, when combining
apps (cf. Section 3.2). Although, for the sake of simplicity, we describe the case
of merging two apps, the approach, and the prototype tool, can perform on
merging any number of apps.
3.1 Overview
The main objective of our work is to enable Android-targeted state-of-the-art
static analysis tools, which have proven to be effective in intra-app analyses, to
perform as well in inter-app analyses. ApkCombiner takes a set of Android apps
as input and yields a new Android app in output. The newly generated app
contains all the features of the input apps except for their IAC features: there is
no more IAC but only ICC in the new generated app.
The different steps of how ApkCombiner works are shown in Fig. 3. Each app
is first disassembled into smali files and a Manifest file using a tool for reverse
engineering Android apk files, namely android-apktool 8. Second, all files from
the apps are checked together for conflicts and integrated (with conflicts solved)
into a directory. The Manifest files, one from each app, are merged into a single
Manifest file. Finally, ApkCombiner assembles the smali files and the Manifest
file along with all other resources, such as image files, into a single apk. Although
8 https://code.google.com/p/android-apktool/
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potential conflicts on such extra-resources may be met, ApkCombiner does not
take them into account since the objective is not to produce a runnable apk, but
an apk that can be analyzed statically.
App 1 Smali Files + Manifest1
Conflicts 
Solving
Smali Files
Merged
ManifestApp 2 Smali Files + Manifest2
New
App
Fig. 3: Working steps of ApkCombiner
3.2 Resolution of Conflicts
Our prototype of ApkCombiner is focused on solving conflicts that may arise
in the merging of code from two different apps. Such conflicts occur when
two classes have the same name (up to the package level, i.e., the absolutely
full qualified name). Thus, given class c1 in app a1 and class c2 in app a2, if
name(c1) = name(c2), we consider that there is a conflict between a1 and a2.
Fig. 4 illustrates the process of conflict checks we use. ApkCombiner considers
that there is no conflict when two classes are named differently. If the name of
two classes are the same, ApkCombiner distinguishes two cases according to the
content of the classes. In a first type of conflict, the classes share the same name
and their content is also the same (after verification of their footprint with the
cryptographic hash), In this case, one copy of the class files is simply dropped.
In the second type of conflict, i.e., when the content of the conflicting files are
different, a thorough refactoring is necessary. This type of conflict occurs when,
for example, two classes are actually from two different versions of the same
library used in the two apps.
name(cls1) == name(cls2) hash(cls1) == hash(cls2)
T TClass 
cls1 and cls2
No 
conflict
The second type 
of conflict (C2)
The first type 
of conflict (C1)
F F
Fig. 4: The conflict checking process of ApkCombiner. Class cls1 and cls2 are from
different apps.
Algorithm 1 details the described strategy for solving conflicts during merging
as implemented by the procedure CheckAndSolveConflicts(). Given two sets
(set1 and set2) of class files corresponding to the code of two apps (a1 and a2),
the algorithm must identify and manage all conflicts.
First, two maps, referred to as confliSameMap and confliDiffMap are
created to keep track of the classes that belong to the two types of conflict
(lines 2-3). After identifying the kind of conflict that exists for each pair of classes
across the two sets, the algorithm can attempt to solve the eventual conflicts.
This resolution is performed in a two-step process. In step 1 (lines 17-22), the
algorithm addresses the cases of type 1 conflicts. In step 2, type 2 conflicts are
solved by refactoring the code.
Refactoring the code to solve conflicts is not as straightforward as renaming
the conflicting classes. Indeed, there is a lot of dependencies to consider within
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Algorithm 1 Checking and solving conflicts
1: procedure CheckAndSolveConflicts(set1, set2)
2: confliSameMap← new Map()
3: confliDiffMap← new Map()
4: for all cls1 ∈ set1 do
5: if set2.contain(cls1) then
6: cls2← set2.get(cls1)
7: if hash(class(cls1)) == hash(class(cls2)) then
8: confliSameMap.put(cls1, cls2)
9: else
10: confliDiffMap.put(cls1, cls2)
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: if empty(confliSameMap, confliDiffMap) then
15: return
16: end if
17: for all cls1, cls2 ∈ confliSameMap do
18: remove class(cls2)
19: if isComponent(cls2) then
20: remove cls2 from Manifest2
21: end if
22: end for
23: for all cls1, cls2 ∈ confliDiffMap do
24: rename cls2
25: solvingDependence(cls2, set2)
26: if isComponent(cls2) then
27: rename cls2 in Manifest2
28: end if
29: end for
30: end procedure
the code of other classes. Procedure solvingDependence(), in line 25, is used
to handle these dependencies, where we take into account three types of de-
pendencies: 1) for a given class c we need to rename, another class ci may use
it as one of its attribute, 2) method mi of class ci may hold a parameter of c
and 3) statement si of method mi may use c as a variable. For the third type
of dependency, we deal with statements that instantiate the variable as well as
access the variable’s attributes and methods because only such statements hold
information related to class c.
To combine multiple Android apps to one, we need not only to integrate
the different apps’ bytecode, but also to merge their Manifest files. In particular
the merge of Manifest files must take into account the fact that some classes
where dropped while others were renamed. If those classes represent Android
components, and not helper code, these changes should be reflected in the final
Manifest of the new app (line 20 and 27).
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4 Evaluation
To assess the efficiency of our approach, we must evaluate the run time perfor-
mance of ApkCombiner to ensure that this does not hinder its practical usability
(cf. Section 4.1). Then, using a dataset with real-world apps, we check whether
our approach is, in the end, capable of enabling state-of-the-art intra-app ana-
lyzers to support inter-app analysis (cf. Section 4.2).
Hypotheses. To run our experiments, we start with the assumption that
the inter-app analysis may reveal significant security issues when a malicious
application can exploit a leak in another, or when two apps can collude to leak
data. To that end, we select a dataset containing both benign and malicious
apps, and assume that, by pairs, they may cohabit in the same device.
Experimental Setup. We select two app sets G and M for our evaluation,
where G is a set of apps randomly selected from Google Play store and M
is a set of malicious apps. These malicious apps were recognized as such after
analysis by VirusTotal antivirus products: we consider that an app is “really”
malicious when at least 20 different antivirus flag it as such. Both G and M
consist each of 3,000 Android apps. Then, for each app gi randomly selected
from G, we associate an app mi, also randomly selected from M . This random
combination only considers the possibility that two apps in one device may be
independently installed by a user on his device. This kind of association provides
3000 opportunities of merging to ApkCombiner.
Our prototype tool succeeded in combining 2, 648 (88.3%) pairs of apps.
Most failures were actually due to the limitations of android-apktool9. A few
failures must however be attributed to the current implementation strategy of
the refactoring process in ApkCombiner. These failures however are currently
under investigation to improve the tool.
During the process of successful combinations, ApkCombiner solved 1,789 first
type conflicts in 322 (12.2%) cases of combining pairs of apps. ApkCombiner also
addressed 3,557 second type conflicts in 493 (18.6%) combination cases.
4.1 Time performance
The evaluation of time performance investigates the scalability of our approach.
Indeed, a user may have on its device dozens apps that cohabit together. Thus,
the inter-app analysis may require a fast combination of all those apps. Fig. 5
plots the running times10 of ApkCombiner for each combined app. The running
time is plotted against the sum size of each pair of apps (we use the bytecode
size, as resource files that are not considered in the merging may introduce a
bias).
9 android-apktool often throws brut.common.BrutException for some combinations
(e.g., could not exec command or Too many open files).
10 Note that in this paper we consider the wall clock time (from start to finish of the
execution). That means not only the actual CPU time but also the waiting time
(e.g., waiting for I/O) are taken into account.
10 Li Li et al.
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Fig. 5: Time performance against the byte code size. C1 represent the set of combina-
tions where first type conflicts were solved, while C2 represents the set of combinations
with second type conflicts.
Let C1 and C2 represent the successful combinations where conflicts of, re-
spectively, first type and second type were solved. Consequently, C1∪C2∪C1 ∪ C2
represents all the successful combinations.
Fig. 5a plots the time performance for all combinations. The linear regression
between the plots shows that there is a correlation between the execution time
and the bytecode size. Comparing with Fig. 5b, we note that the slope of the
regression is lower when we do not consider combinations that lead to conflicts.
The limited difference in slope values (0.246 against 0.157) indicates that the
conflict solving module is not a runtime bottleneck.
The differences between Fig. 5c, Fig. 5d and Fig. 5e further confirm how
the resolution of second type conflicts requires more execution time than the
resolution of first type conflicts.
4.2 Inter-app analysis
We consider IccTA [16], a state-of-the-art Android intra-app analysis tool, which
originally aims at detecting inter-component privacy leaks inside a single Android
app. We select IccTA to validate our approach by investigating the effectiveness
of ApkCombiner in supporting existing tools for performing inter-app analyses.
With ApkCombiner we build app packages by combining pairs of apps. We
then feed IccTA with these newly generated apps and assess its analysis results.
We evaluate the use of IccTA in combination with ApkCombiner in two steps.
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In the first step, we evaluate the impact of ApkCombiner on DroidBench, which
includes three test cases related to inter-app communication leaks. We found that
IccTA is able to report inter-app privacy leaks for the analyzed apps by analyzing
the combined package provided by ApkCombiner. To the best of our knowledge,
DidFail is currently the only tool which claims to be able to perform static inter-
app analysis for privacy leaks. We therefore compare DidFail with our approach
associated to an existing state-of-the-art tool for intra-app analysis. The results
in Table 3 based the DroidBench benchmark show that IccTA, while it cannot
handle inter-app analysis alone, outperforms DidFail when it is supported by
ApkCombiner. The reason why DidFail fails on two test cases is that at the
moment DidFail only focuses on Activity-based privacy leaks.
Table 3: Comparison between IccTA, DidFail and ApkCombiner+IccTA.
Test Case (from DroidBench) IccTA DidFail ApkCombiner+IccTA
InterAppCommunication startactivity1 7 3 3
InterAppCommunication startservice1 7 7 3
InterAppCommunication sendbroadcast1 7 7 3
In the second step, we evaluate ApkCombiner on 3,000 real Android apps.
We first build an IAC graph through the results of our extended Epicc [16, 18],
where an app stands for a node and an inter-app communication is modeled as
an edge. For each of such edges, we launched ApkCombiner on the associated
pair of apps and then used IccTA on the generated app.
We were thus able to discover an IAC leak between app Ibadah Evaluation11
and app ClipStore12. In the Ibadah Evaluation apk code, the source method find-
ViewById is called in component com.bi.mutabaah.id.activity.Statistic,
where the data of a TextView is obtained. Then this data is stored into an Intent
along with two extras, a subject named android.intent.extra.SUBJECT and
the text referred to as android.intent.extra.TEXT. Subsequently, the trigger-
ing method startActivity is used to transfer the Intent data to the ClipStrore app
which extracts the data from the Intent with the same extra names and writes
all the data into a file named clip.txt. Note that we consider saving sensitive
data into disk as a leak.
5 Discussion
Scalability. As introduced in Section 4.1, ApkCombiner scales linearly with
the bytecode size. Unfortunately, in practice, when increasing the bytecode size
(e.g., increasing the number of apps to combine), the processing time and mem-
ory requirement of Android analysis tools (e.g., IccTA or FlowDroid) also grow
significantly. Thus such approaches may not be scalable when running on top of
ApkCombiner. To limit the impact of this scalability issue, a possible approach is
to limit the number of Android apps to combine. This is a reasonable limitation,
as the number of apps obstructs the work of attackers as well. For example, given
11 https://worldapks.com/ibadah-evaluation/, com.bi.mutabaah.id in our dataset.
12 https://worldapks.com/clipstore/, jp.benishouga.clipstore in our dataset.
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Fig. 6: An example of an IAC graph and a trade-off threshold t.
an effective attack, the more number of apps involved, the more complexity of
building such attack introduced and the less probability of a user installing all
of the involved apps. Our solution is to build an IAC graph to represent the
dependencies among apps, the idea being that if there is no link (edge) between
two apps (nodes) there is no need to combine them. Based on the IAC graph, we
introduce a threshold t to denote the maximum number of apps ApkCombiner
may combine together. The trade-off limitation length t enables existing intra-
app analyzers to remain scalable when used with ApkCombiner.
Let us take Fig. 6 as an example, which shows an IAC graph and the concept
of threshold t. For app a1, if we set t = 2, then we only need to run ApkCombiner
6 times (the small circle) and most importantly we only need to combine 2 (or t)
apps each time. Notice that with the built IAC graph, new apps can be added to
the graph in an iterative and incremental manner. When new apps are involved,
we only need to add them to the existing IAC graph. We do not need to run the
previously computed apps again when adding the new apps. In short, by building
an IAC graph and setting up a threshold t, the original set of Android apps is
split into multiple small sets that both ApkCombiner and the state-of-the-art
intra-app analysis tools can analyze.
Limitations. At the moment, we do not offer a guarantee that the newly
generated app can be executed. Except from the bytecode and Manifest, we
simply combine all the other resources such as native code, layout files without
checking whether they are conflicted or not. This may result in errors for analysis
tools that rely on such resources.
6 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, in the Android community, our approach is the first
work that attempts to complement existing state-of-the-art intra-app analysis
tools to indirectly support inter-app analyses. Our approach is also the first
proposal that supports context-aware inter-app analysis. However, researches on
detecting IAC vulnerabilities are not new.
Privilege escalation attack, an IAC vulnerability, has been studied by a large
body of works [3, 6, 8]. Davi et al. [6] show that a genuine app can be exploited
at runtime and a malicious app can escalate granted permissions. Prominent
examples of privilege escalation attacks are confused deputy and collusion at-
tacks [3]. Confused deputy attack is about the possibility for malicious app to
exploit another privileged (but confused) app’s vulnerable interface. Collusion
ApkCombiner: Combining Multiple Android Apps 13
attack concerns the collusion of apps that combine their permissions to be able
to perform actions beyond their individual privileges. Our approach differs from
theirs because we are focusing on supporting static inter-app analysis, while they
are using dynamic testing to detect such vulnerabilities.
ComDroid [4] analyzed inter-app communication in Android apps and dis-
covered IAC vulnerabilities such as Broadcast Injection and Activity Hijacking.
Epicc [18] is another tool that dedicated to identify IAC vulnerabilities in An-
droid apps. Besides, Epicc records the actual values of IAC objects, which makes
it appropriate to build inter-component (or inter-app) links. ContentScope [22]
is another tool which detects Content Provider based vulnerabilities. It ar-
gues that a Content Provider component can leak sensitive data to other apps
and malicious apps can also pollute data maintained by a Content Provider.
More recently, PCLeaks [17] was proposed to perform data-flow analysis on the
above IAC vulnerabilities to discover potential component leaks, which may leak
private data across Android apps. While the above static approaches are tack-
ling IAC vulnerabilities, they are actually only analyzing one app at a time and
their outputs are so-called potential results. Our approach is able to complement
them by enabling them to indirectly perform inter-app analysis and give them
an opportunity to conform that the aforementioned potential vulnerabilities are
exploitable in real-world apps.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one, recent, static approach,
DidFail [13], which is able to perform static inter-app analysis. However, as
shown in Section 2.2 (type (B1)), DidFail simply combines the results of intra-
app analyses following an approach which is neither context-aware nor general.
In contrast, our approach is able to provide a general context-aware inter-app
analysis, and therefore, all intra-app analyzers can benefit from it.
7 Conclusion
We discussed ApkCombiner, a tool-based approach for reducing an Inter-App
Communication problem into an intra-app Inter-Component Communication
problem by combining multiple Android apps into one. After the combination,
existing intra-app analysis approaches can be applied on the generated An-
droid app to indirectly report inter-app results. Since we combine apps at code
level, our approach is context-aware and general. We evaluate ApkCombiner to
demonstrate that, despite a conflict resolution algorithm that requires a time-
consuming refactoring process, the approach is scalable. We further showed that
it can improve the capabilities of existing state-of-the-art tools. For example, we
showed that using ApkCombiner can enable tools such as IccTA to discover IAC
privacy leaks in real-world apps.
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